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Network coding has shown a considerable improvement in terms of capacity and robustness compared to traditional store-and-
forward transmission paradigm. However, since the intermediate nodes in network coding-enabled networks have the ability
to change the packets en route, network coding-enabled networks are vulnerable to pollution attacks where a small number of
polluted messages can corrupt bunches of legitimate messages. Recently, research effort has been put on schemes for protecting the
transmitted messages against data pollution attacks. However, most of them cannot resist tag pollution attacks.This paper presents
a new homomorphic MAC-based scheme, called Dual-Homomorphic MAC (Dual-HMAC), for network coding-enabled wireless
sensor networks.The proposed scheme makes use of two types of tags (i.e., MACs and D-MACs) to provide resistance against data
pollution attacks and partially tag pollution attacks. Furthermore, our proposed scheme presents low communication overhead
and low computational complexity compared to other existing schemes.
1. Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have been recently used
in a plethora of applications of many different areas, such as
surveillance monitoring, environmental monitoring, traffic
control, natural disaster prevention, and e-health. Due to
their wide range of applications, they have already become
so attractive to research community. However, WSNs are
characterized by low communication bandwidth and power
consumption constraints [1].Thus, network coding (NC) can
be a promising solution for WSNs, since it is a technique
that can provide network capacity improvement [2] and lower
energy consumption [3].
NCwas introduced by Ahlswede et al. [2]. Nowadays, NC
has been used in various applications over different networks,
such as wireless mesh networks [4], wireless sensor networks
[5], and peer-to-peer systems [6]. In contrast to traditional
and classical commodity flow, where information is only
routed or replicated, information flow can also employ coding
operations at intermediate nodes. In [7], random linear
network coding (RLNC) was studied as a fully distributed
method for performing network coding. Also, in [7], it is
mentioned that there is a possibility for each node in the
network to select a set of coefficients independently and
randomly and use them to make linear combinations of the
data symbols.
However, NC is more susceptible to data pollution attack
than the traditional store-and-forward approach. If a data
pollution attack is not detected at the forwarders, then the
sink nodes will not be able to recover the source messages
correctly. It is worthwhile to mention that even a small
number of polluted messages can infect a large number
of downstream nodes because the pollution propagates via
recoding. Furthermore, NC-enabled networks are also vul-
nerable to tag pollution attack, which is a more sophisticated
type of pollution attack. In tag pollution attack, the adversary
targets at modifying (i.e., polluting) the tags carried by the
messages rather than modifying the content of the messages.
It is possible for amessagewith polluted tags to travelmultiple
hops until it is detected and discarded. Yet, this results in a
waste of network bandwidth.
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Thus far, several cryptographic schemes such as homo-
morphic hash functions, signatures, and MACs have been
presented to secure network coding against data and tag
pollution attacks (e.g., [8, 9]). Furthermore, information-
theoretic schemes have been also proposed (e.g., [10, 11]) to
detect data pollution attacks. Although information-theoretic
schemes are more efficient, in terms of computation, com-
pared to the cryptographic schemes, they can only detect
polluted packets at the sink nodes.
Among all the above mentioned proposed schemes,
Homomorphic MAC is considered as a low-complexity
solution against data pollution [12, 13]. Specifically, a MAC
or tag is a small piece of information appended to the end of
the message packet. This piece of information is the output
of a MAC function taking as inputs the message packet
and a secret key. However, this solution is vulnerable to tag
pollution attacks.
In this paper, we propose a new homomorphic MAC-
based scheme, called Dual-Homomorphic MAC (Dual-
HMAC), for NC-enabled WSNs, in order to mitigate both
data pollution attacks and partially tag pollution attacks.
In our scheme, the source generates multiple MACs and
DualMACs (D-MACs) for eachmessage. EachMAC ensures
integrity of the transmitted message and each D-MAC
ensures integrity of the MACs. In other words, by appending
D-MACs, the proposed scheme mitigates partially tag pollu-
tion attacks.
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. In Section 2,
we give an overview of the related work on security schemes
against data pollution attacks and tag pollution attacks in
NC-enabled networks. In Section 3, the problem statement is
discussed. In Section 4, our proposedDual-HMAC scheme is
presented. In Section 5, the security analysis of the proposed
scheme takes place. In Section 6, its performance evaluation
is given. In Section 7, a comparison among the communi-
cation and computation overhead of our work (i.e., Dual-
HMAC) and the communication and computation overhead
of the related works in [9, 14] is provided. Finally, Section 8
concludes the paper.
2. Related Work
In this section, we present related work on security schemes
against pollution attacks in NC-enabled networks. In addi-
tion, we present the key distribution mechanisms used by
these security schemes.
2.1. Security Schemes against Pollution Attacks in NC-Enabled
Networks. Most of the research in the field of pollution
attacks in network coding is focused on two types of security
schemes: information-theoretic schemes [10, 11] and crypto-
graphic schemes [14, 15].
2.1.1. Cryptographic Schemes. These schemes rely on addi-
tional verification information which is added by the sources
through cryptographic techniques. This allows intermediate
nodes to verify the original messages and filter out the
polluted ones. This category includes the homomorphic
hashing schemes, the homomorphic signature schemes, and
the homomorphic MACs.
(a) Homomorphic Hashing Schemes. Homomorphic hashing
schemes are based on a homomorphic hash function which is
applied by the source to themessages.These schemes rely also
on additional secure communication channels in order to
transmit the calculated hash values to the intermediate nodes.
A well-known homomorphic hashing scheme is proposed by
Krohn et al. in [8] which enables the intermediate nodes to
verify on-the-fly.The extension of this work was presented in
[16] which is focused on network coding-enabled networks
and further reduces the expensive computation cost of hash
functions in each intermediate node by enabling cooperation
verification.
(b) Homomorphic Signature Schemes. Homomorphic signa-
ture schemes were introduced for the first time by Charles et
al. in [17] and have been based on Weil pairing over elliptic
curves.The homomorphic property of the signatures in these
schemes allows nodes to sign any linear combination of the
incoming packets without contacting the signing entity. The
calculation of signature covers thewhole augmentedmessage.
In [18], Yu et al. proposed a homomorphic signature function
which allows the relay nodes to verify the received messages
by generating the signatures without contacting the signing
entities. In Yu’s scheme, the communication does not need
any extra secure communication channel.Their experimental
results show that its verification efficiency is improved up to
10 times compared to the other relatedwork (i.e., CJLs scheme
[17]). Moreover, in [10], an alternative lightweight scheme is
proposed. It is much faster rather than Yu’s scheme, but it is
not as secure as the first one.
(c) Homomorphic MACs. Homomorphic MACs are based
on appending some extra information to the original mes-
sage. The basic definition of homomorphic MAC is defined
by Agrawal and Boneh in [14] which allows the integrity
checking of the network coded data. However, this idea is
susceptible to tag pollution attacks. Kehdi and Baochun [19]
presented a homomorphic MAC scheme to detect pollution
attacks based on the subspace properties of random linear
network coding, where null keys for verification are used.
As a lot of null keys are used in each generation, a high
bandwidth overhead can be incurred. The authors in [13]
proposed an idea where the source attaches multiple MACs
to each packet. This idea can be applied for XOR network
coding networks; however it is vulnerable to tag pollution
attacks. RIPPLE [20] was proposed to counteract against the
tag pollution problem.This work is based on a symmetric key
based scheme for network coding authentication. RIPPLE
allows a node to efficiently detect corrupted packets and
encode only the authenticated (i.e., verified) ones. However,
the global synchronization among all nodes is the problem
of this scheme. In [9], the authors presented a hybrid-key
cryptography approach which could achieve authentication
in the presence of both data and tag pollution attacks. To
achieve this, a number of tags and a signature are appended
to each transmitted message. However, the signature which
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is necessary for preventing tag pollution is a time consuming
process.
2.1.2. Information-Theoretic Schemes. The information-
theoretic schemes benefit from the reasonable computation
performance in comparing to the cryptographic schemes,
but they have two main drawbacks. First of all, they are
not able to detect the polluted messages at the intermediate
nodes of the network. For example, the work presented
in [10], which extends the random network coding,
relies on coding redundant information into the original
messages allowing only the receivers to detect the polluted
messages. Furthermore, the information-theoretic schemes
are characterized by the limitation on the number of
compromised nodes. These two drawbacks comprise
the main motivation to interest to the cryptographic
schemes.
2.2. Key Distribution Mechanisms in NC-Enabled Networks.
Nowadays, in emerging multicast communication systems
(e.g., pay TV and video-conferencing services), the key
distribution is a challenging issue. There are various pro-
posed schemes for key distribution in multicast systems.
Key distribution models can be categorized in trusted-server
schemes [21], public-key schemes, and key predistribution
schemes [22]. The trusted-server and public-key schemes
are infeasible to be used in WSNs as the sensors have
limitations in terms of energy and computing processes. On
the other hand, key predistribution schemes are feasible to
be used in WSNs. In these schemes, the shared keys are
distributed among the nodes of a group in such a way that
every node in the group is able to compute individually a
common key associatedwith that group. Two examples of key
predistribution schemes are given as follows.
In MacSig which is an efficient subspace authentication
scheme for NC and presented in [9], the double-random
key distribution has been proposed. This proposed keys
distribution model includes two random procedures. First
of all, they assign each node with a random set of keys;
next, the source node randomly selects a subset of keys from
the key pools and uses these keys to generate the MACs.
However, it is necessary to attach the indexes of these keys
to each packet. Hence, a considerable bandwidth overhead is
incurred.
In KEPTE (key predistribution-based tag encoding)
scheme, a key distribution model for practical NC has been
proposed in [23]. According to this key distribution model,
a Key Distribution Center (KDC) is responsible for the
distribution of the keys. The KDC allocates 𝑁 secret vectors
at the source node to produce 𝑁 tags. Moreover, it assigns
two secret vectors to each node to check the correctness of its
received packets.
3. Problem Statement
In this section, we provide our problem statement through a
network coding-enabled WSN model and its corresponding
adversary model.
Source
S
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Figure 1: A general multicast network.
3.1. Network Coding-Enabled WSN Model. We consider a
network coding-enabled WSN, as it is depicted in Figure 1,
consisting of a source node 𝑆, a number of intermediate
nodes, and a set of sink nodes. Random linear network coding
is exploited in this network. In order to model our network,
we define a triple (𝐺, 𝑆, 𝑅) which consists of the following
components:
(i) directed multigraph 𝐺: we consider a pair of 𝑉, 𝐸 as
a directed acyclic graph where 𝑉 and 𝐸 are the node
sets and edge sets of 𝐺, respectively;
(ii) source node 𝑆: in our networkmodel, we have a source
𝑆 that wants to multicast its messages;
(iii) non-source node 𝑅: we define relay and sink nodes in
a set of nodes which is defined as: 𝑅 = {∀𝑥 ∈ 𝑉− {𝑆}}.
Notations section summarizes themain notations used in this
paper.
Prior to transmission, the source node partitionsmessage
packets into generations. Each generation consists of 𝑚
messages packets denoted as u
1
, u
2
, . . . , u
𝑚
. Each packet u
𝑖
is represented as a vector of 𝑛 symbols (𝑢
𝑖,1
, 𝑢
𝑖,2
, . . . , 𝑢
𝑖,𝑛
) in
the finite field F𝑛
𝑝
. In [24], it is shown that 𝑝 = 28 is usually
sufficient for practical use and convenient for computation.
Then, the source node generates an augmented packet u
𝑖
by prefixing u
𝑖
with the 𝑖th unit vector of dimension 𝑚
represented as
u
𝑖
= (
𝑚
⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞ ⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞
0, . . . , 0⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟
𝑖−1
, 1, 0, . . . , 0, 𝑢
𝑖,1
, . . . , 𝑢
𝑖,𝑛
) ∈ F
𝑚+𝑛
𝑝
. (1)
After that, the source node transmits these augmented
packets to its neighbour nodes. During transmission, an
intermediate node buffers its received packets u
𝑖
temporarily
and creates an outgoing message 𝑦 as linear combinations of
packets u
1
, u
2
, . . . , u
ℎ
belonging to the same generation:
𝑦 =
ℎ
∑
𝑖=1
𝑐
𝑖
u
𝑖
, (2)
where each 𝑐
𝑖
∈ F
𝑝
is a random coefficient chosen by each
forwarder. A coded packet 𝑦 is considered to be valid if it
is in the linear subspace spanned by the original augmented
packets, denoted as 𝑦 ∈ Span{u
1
, . . . , u
𝑚
}. In fact, when 𝑦
is valid, these linear combination coefficients are the first 𝑚
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Figure 2: A basic scenario of tag pollution. We consider a scenario which has a packet and 4 tags. We consider a node A as an adversary that
pollutes the second tag 𝑡
2
of the packet. In (a), we see that the next hop, node B, has two sets of keys (𝐾
2
,𝐾
3
) and is able to detect tag pollution.
As a result node B discards the packet. In (b), the next hop, node B does not have (𝐾
2
), so it allows the polluted packet to pass which results
in wasted bandwidth; however, the hop, node C is able to detect the polluted packet. In the last scenario shown in (c), we demonstrate the
case, where totally wasted bandwidth occurs since none of the nodes holds key 𝐾
2
.
symbols of the packet 𝑦. Otherwise, 𝑦 is invalid and it is
denoted as 𝑦 ∉ Span{u
1
, . . . , u
𝑚
}, which may be caused by
transmission errors or pollution attacks. After transmission,
when a sink node has obtained𝑚 linearly independent coded
packets, it can decode those using Gaussian eliminations, so
as to recover the original messages [7].
3.2. Adversary Model. For the above mentioned network
coding-enabled model, we consider that the source is always
trusted and there is no possibility to forge it, but the interme-
diate and sink nodes can be compromised. The adversary is
able to wiretap all the data packets that are transmitted over
a network.The adversary’s goal is to achieve pollution attack.
There are two types of pollution attack.
Data Pollution Attack. An adversary can inject fake data
packets into the network. The objective of data pollution
attack is to pass the verification of other innocent nodes
and to cause incorrect decoding at the sink node, as well as
wasting of bandwidth.
Tag Pollution Attack. An adversary injects a corrupted packet
consisting of correct data but modified tags to the network.
The objective of tag pollution is to discard the correct data
packets due to the corresponding corrupted tags. This results
in the waste of bandwidth. A basic scenario of tag pollution
attack is presented in Figure 2.
4. Proposed Scheme: Dual-Homomorphic
MAC (Dual-HMAC)
In this section, we present our Dual-HMAC scheme, which
mitigates data pollution and partially tags pollution attacks
for a network coding-enabled WSN. The Dual-HMAC
scheme’s outline, the construction and the correctness of the
scheme, and the key distribution model are provided in this
section.
Our proposed solution is based on the homomorphic
MAC solution, defined by Agrawal and Boneh [14], and the
MacSig scheme proposed in [9]. Additionally, our proposed
scheme makes use of additional MACs, termed as D-MACs,
in order to resist data pollution and partially tag pollution
attacks. In contrast to the homomorphic MAC solution in
[14], our proposed scheme is not susceptible to tag pollution
attacks. Particularly, our proposed scheme can achieve resis-
tance for the half of the tags against tag pollution attack with
significant low computational complexity compared to the
MacSig scheme, which uses a signature scheme characterized
by a much considerable computational overhead.
Our scheme consists of three steps, as it is depicted
in Figure 3, in order to generate the required MACs and
D-MACs. In step 1, it computes a number of MACs (i.e.,
tags), for each message, according to the keys which are
chosen randomly from the first pool of keys. Then, in step
2, it computes a number of D-MACs for the initial MACs,
according to the keys which are chosen from the second pool
of keys. Finally, in step 3, the computed MACs and D-MACs
are appended to themessage. More specifically, the main idea
of our work is based on the orthogonal subspace property
[9].
4.1. The Outline of the Dual-HMAC Scheme. In this section,
we provide description of the proposed Dual-HMAC scheme
with a formal method. This scheme includes four steps:
setup, tag generation, verification, and encoding detailed as
follows.
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Figure 3: The basic idea of Dual-HMAC scheme which is related to the padding orthogonality property.
4.1.1. Setup
(a) Key Distribution Centre (KDC) distributes the fol-
lowing two sets of secrete key vectors to the source
node 𝑆: K
𝑆
= {k
1
, k
2
, . . . , k
𝐿
}, k
𝑙
∈ F𝑚+𝑛+1
𝑝
and
K󸀠
𝑆
= {k󸀠
1
, k󸀠
2
, . . . , k󸀠
𝐿
󸀠}, k󸀠
𝑙
󸀠 ∈ F
𝐿+1
𝑝
. KDC also dis-
tributes the following two subsets of secrete vectors
to all intermediate nodes and sink nodes: K
𝑛
𝑖
=
{k
1
, . . . , k
𝑅
}, k
𝑟
∈ F𝑚+𝑛+1
𝑝
, and K󸀠
𝑛
𝑖
= {k󸀠
1
, . . . , k󸀠
𝑅
󸀠},
k󸀠
𝑟
󸀠 ∈ F
𝐿+1
𝑝
.
(b) Note thatK
𝑆
∩K󸀠
𝑆
= ⌀,K
𝑛
𝑖
⊂K
𝑆
,K󸀠
𝑛
𝑖
⊂K󸀠
𝑆
, and
if 𝑖 ̸= 𝑗, thenK
𝑛
𝑖
̸=K
𝑛
𝑗
andK󸀠
𝑛
𝑖
̸=K󸀠
𝑛
𝑗
.
(c) Note that the subscriptions 𝑙, 𝑙󸀠, 𝑟, and 𝑟󸀠 represent
the index of the key, which do not change in different
subsets. In other words, if k
𝑙
= k
𝑟
, then 𝑙 = 𝑟; if
k
𝑙
󸀠 = k
𝑟
󸀠 , then 𝑙󸀠 = 𝑟󸀠.
The detail of probabilistic key distribution algorithm will
be described in Section 4.4, as well as how to choose the key
set size.
4.1.2. Tag Generation. For every data packet u
𝑖
∈ F𝑚+𝑛
𝑝
,
the source uses the MAC(k
1
, k
2
, . . . , k
𝐿
, u
𝑖
) and
D-MAC(k󸀠
1
, k󸀠
2
, . . . , k󸀠
𝐿
󸀠 , 𝑡u
𝑖
,1
, . . . , 𝑡u
𝑖
,𝐿
) algorithms to generate
the (𝐿 + 𝐿󸀠) tags.
4.1.3. Verification. When a relay or sink node receives a coded
packet𝑦 ∈ F𝑚+𝑛
𝑝
with its tags, this node checks the correctness
of packet 𝑦 using the algorithm Verify via its predistributed
keysK
𝑛
𝑖
andK󸀠
𝑛
𝑖
. If the output is 1, then the received coded
packet 𝑦 is considered to be a correct one. Otherwise, this
packet is discarded.
4.1.4. Encoding. When an intermediate node receives
ℎ encoded packets 𝑢
𝑖
∈ F𝑚+𝑛
𝑝
(1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℎ), and they
all are checked or considered to be correct, a forward
coded packet along with new tags is generated using the
Combine((u
𝑖
, 𝑡u
𝑖
,1
, . . . , 𝑡u
𝑖
,𝐿
, 𝑡
󸀠
u
𝑖
,1
, . . . , 𝑡
󸀠
u
𝑖
,𝐿
󸀠)
ℎ
𝑖=1
, (𝑐
𝑖
)
ℎ
𝑖=1
) algo-
rithm with locally randomly generated coefficients 𝑐
𝑖
.
4.2. The Construction. In this subsection, we provide the
construction of the scheme. Particularly, we present the
above-mentioned four algorithms, namely, MAC, D-MAC,
Combine, andVerify, in detail.The algorithmMACcomputes
𝐿 tags for each data packet u
𝑖
, and the algorithm D-MAC
computes another 𝐿󸀠 tags for the 𝐿 tags. Moreover, the
algorithm Combine generates new tags for RLNC encoded
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packet. Furthermore, the algorithm Verify checks the cor-
rectness of a data packet with all tags. Details of these four
algorithms are described as follows.
4.2.1.𝑀𝐴𝐶(K
𝑆
,𝑢
𝑖
)
(i) Input:K
𝑆
consists of 𝐿 secrete vectors k
1
, k
2
, . . . , k
𝐿
∈
F𝑚+𝑛+1
𝑝
, and the 𝑖th data packet u
𝑖
∈ F𝑚+𝑛
𝑝
as shown in
(1).
(ii) Output: 𝐿 tags 𝑡u
𝑖
,1
, 𝑡u
𝑖
,2
, . . . , 𝑡u
𝑖
,𝐿
∈ F
𝑝
for packet u
𝑖
,
where
𝑡u
𝑖
,𝑙
= −
(∑
𝑚+𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑢
𝑖,𝑗
𝑘
𝑙,𝑗
)
𝑘
𝑙,𝑚+𝑛+1
. (3)
4.2.2.𝐷-𝑀𝐴𝐶(K󸀠
𝑆
,𝑡
𝑢
𝑖
,1
,. . .,𝑡
𝑢
𝑖
,𝐿
)
(i) Input: K󸀠
𝑆
consists of 𝐿󸀠 secrete vectors k󸀠
1
, k󸀠
2
, . . .,
k󸀠
𝐿
󸀠 ∈ F
𝐿+1
𝑝
, and the 𝐿 tags 𝑡u
𝑖
,𝑙
∈ F
𝑝
generated in (3)
for the packet u
𝑖
.
(ii) Output: 𝐿󸀠 tags 𝑡󸀠u
𝑖
,1
, 𝑡
󸀠
u
𝑖
,2
, . . . , 𝑡
󸀠
u
𝑖
,𝐿
󸀠 ∈ F𝑝 for packet u𝑖,
where
𝑡
󸀠
u
𝑖
,𝑙
󸀠 = −
(∑
𝐿
𝑗=1
𝑡u
𝑖
,𝑗
𝑘
󸀠
𝑙
󸀠
,𝑗
)
𝑘
𝑙
󸀠
,𝐿+1
. (4)
4.2.3. 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒((𝑢
𝑖
,𝑡
𝑢
𝑖
,1
,. . .,𝑡
𝑢
𝑖
,𝐿
,𝑡
󸀠
𝑢
𝑖
,1
,. . .,𝑡
󸀠
𝑢
𝑖
,𝐿
󸀠)
ℎ
𝑖=1
,(𝑐
𝑖
)
ℎ
𝑖=1
)
(i) Input: ℎ vectors u
𝑖
∈ F𝑚+𝑛
𝑝
(1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℎ) as shown in (2),
eachwith (𝐿+𝐿󸀠) tags 𝑡
𝑢
𝑖
,1
, . . . , 𝑡
𝑢
𝑖
,𝐿
, 𝑡
󸀠
𝑢
𝑖
,1
, . . . , 𝑡
󸀠
𝑢
𝑖
,𝐿
󸀠 ∈ F𝑝
(1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℎ), and ℎ constants 𝑐
1
, . . . , 𝑐
ℎ
∈ F
𝑝
.
(ii) Output: a coded packet with (𝐿 + 𝐿󸀠) tags generated
by
(𝑦, 𝑡
𝑦,1
, . . . , 𝑡
𝑦,𝐿
, 𝑡
󸀠
𝑦,1
, . . . , 𝑡
󸀠
𝑦,𝐿
󸀠)
=
ℎ
∑
𝑖=1
𝑐
𝑖
(𝑢
𝑖
, 𝑡
𝑢
𝑖
,1
, . . . , 𝑡
𝑢
𝑖
,𝐿
, 𝑡
󸀠
𝑢
𝑖
,1
, . . . , 𝑡
󸀠
𝑢
𝑖
,𝐿
󸀠) .
(5)
4.2.4. 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑦(K
𝑛
𝑖
,K󸀠
𝑛
𝑖
,(𝑦,𝑡
𝑦,1
,. . .,𝑡
𝑦,𝐿
,𝑡
󸀠
𝑦,1
,. . .,𝑡
󸀠
𝑦,𝐿
󸀠))
(i) Input: K
𝑛
𝑖
consists of secrete vectors k
1
, . . . , k
𝑅
∈
F𝑚+𝑛+1
𝑝
, {k
1
, . . . , k
𝑅
} ⊂ {k
1
, . . . , k
𝐿
} and K󸀠
𝑛
𝑖
consists
of secrete vectors k󸀠
1
, . . . , k󸀠
𝑅
󸀠 ∈ F
𝐿+1
𝑝
, {k󸀠
1
, . . . , k󸀠
𝑅
󸀠} ⊂
{k󸀠
1
, k󸀠
2
, . . . , k󸀠
𝐿
󸀠}, as well as a RLNC encoded packet
𝑦 ∈ F𝑚+𝑛
𝑝
with (𝐿+𝐿󸀠) tags 𝑡
𝑦,1
, . . . , 𝑡
𝑦,𝐿
, 𝑡
󸀠
𝑦,1
, . . . , 𝑡
󸀠
𝑦,𝐿
󸀠 ∈
F
𝑝
.
(ii) Output: if
∀k
𝑟
∈ {k
1
, . . . , k
𝑅
} , 𝛿
𝑟
= (
𝑚+𝑛
∑
𝑗=1
𝑦
𝑗
𝑘
𝑟,𝑗
) + 𝑡
𝑦,𝑟
𝑘
𝑟,𝑚+𝑛+1
= 0,
(6)
∀k󸀠
𝑟
󸀠 ∈ {k󸀠
1
, . . . , k󸀠
𝑅
󸀠} , 𝛿
󸀠
𝑟
󸀠 = (
𝐿
∑
𝑗=1
𝑡
𝑦,𝑗
𝑘
󸀠
𝑟
󸀠
,𝑗
) + 𝑡
󸀠
𝑦,𝑟
󸀠𝑘
󸀠
𝑟
󸀠
,𝐿+1
= 0
(7)
then output 1; otherwise output 0.
4.3. The Correctness of Dual-HMAC. The proposed Dual-
HMAC is going to be correct if the Verify algorithm could
produce output 1 for the valid data packet and the valid RLNC
encoded packet. Rigorously speaking, it should satisfy the
following condition:
If Verify(K
𝑛
𝑖
,K󸀠
𝑛
𝑖
, (u
𝑖
,MAC(K
𝑆
, u
𝑖
), D-MAC(K󸀠
𝑆
,
u
𝑖
)) = 1 and
If Verify(K
𝑛
𝑗
,K󸀠
𝑛𝑗
, (u
𝑗
, 𝑡u
𝑗
,1
, . . . , 𝑡u
𝑗
,𝐿
, 𝑡
󸀠
u
𝑗
,1
, . . . , 𝑡
󸀠
u
𝑗
,𝐿
󸀠))
= 1, ∀𝑗 = 1, . . . , ℎ, then
Verify(K
𝑛
𝑗
,K󸀠
𝑛
𝑗
, Combine((u
𝑗
, 𝑡u
𝑗
,1
, . . . , 𝑡u
𝑗
,𝐿
, 𝑡󸀠u
𝑗
,1
,
. . ., 𝑡󸀠u
𝑗
,𝐿
󸀠)
ℎ
𝑗=1
, (𝑐
𝑗
)
ℎ
𝑗=1
)) = 1.
Theorem 1. The first verification is correct.
Proof. According to the description of “Setup,” since K
𝑛
𝑖
⊂
K
𝑆
, ∀k
𝑟
∈K
𝑛
𝑖
, there is a key k
𝑙
= k
𝑟
and 𝑙 = 𝑟. As a result, by
letting 𝑦 = u
𝑖
, k
𝑙
= k
𝑟
, and substituting 𝑡
𝑦,𝑟
= 𝑡u
𝑖
,𝑙
using (3), it
is for sure that (6) 𝛿
𝑟
= 0, ∀k
𝑟
∈K
𝑛
𝑖
.
Similarly, since K󸀠
𝑛
𝑖
⊂ K󸀠
𝑆
, ∀k󸀠
𝑟
󸀠 ∈ K
󸀠
𝑛
𝑖
, there is a key
k
𝑙
󸀠 = k
𝑟
󸀠 and 𝑙󸀠 = 𝑟󸀠. As a result, by letting𝑦 = u
𝑖
,k
𝑙
󸀠 = k
𝑟
󸀠 , and
substituting 𝑡󸀠
𝑦,𝑟
󸀠 = 𝑡
󸀠
u
𝑖
,𝑙
󸀠 using (4), it is for sure that (7) 𝛿󸀠
𝑟
󸀠 = 0,
∀k󸀠
𝑟
󸀠 ∈K
󸀠
𝑛
𝑖
.
As a result, Verify(K
𝑛
𝑖
,K󸀠
𝑛
𝑖
, (u
𝑖
,MAC(K
𝑆
, u
𝑖
),
D-MAC(K󸀠
𝑆
, u
𝑖
)) = 1.
Theorem 2. The second verification is correct.
Proof. According to (3), the tags are created in a way that k
𝑙
is orthogonal to the concatenation of u
𝑖
and its 𝑙 tags k
𝑙
⊥
(u
𝑖
‖ 𝑡u
𝑖
,𝑙
). This relationship is true for all packets in the same
generation, which represents as k
𝑙
⊥ Span{(u
𝑖
‖ 𝑡u
𝑖
,𝑙
)
𝑚
𝑖=1
}.
If Verify(K
𝑛
𝑗
,K󸀠
𝑛𝑗
, (u
𝑗
, 𝑡u
𝑗
,1
, . . . , 𝑡u
𝑗
,𝐿
, 𝑡
󸀠
u
𝑗
,1
, . . . , 𝑡
󸀠
u
𝑗
,𝐿
󸀠)) =
1, ∀𝑗 = 1, . . . , ℎ, then k
𝑙
⊥ Span{(u
𝑗
‖ 𝑡u
𝑗
,𝑙
)
ℎ
𝑗=1
}. Moreover, the
algorithm Combine is a linear combination, which does not
change the subspace. Hence, (𝑦 ‖ 𝑡
𝑦,𝑙
) ∈ Span{(u
𝑗
‖ 𝑡u
𝑗
,𝑙
)
ℎ
𝑗=1
},
k
𝑙
⊥ (𝑦 ‖ 𝑡
𝑦,𝑙
), and (6) 𝛿
𝑟
= 0, ∀k
𝑟
∈K
𝑛
𝑖
. Similarly, we could
derive 𝛿󸀠
𝑟
󸀠 = 0, ∀k󸀠
𝑟
󸀠 ∈K
󸀠
𝑛
𝑖
. As a result, the output of Verify is
1, and the second condition is also correct.
4.4. Key Distribution Model. In our work, we assume that
a set of symmetric keys are distributed to all participant
nodes in a secure and authenticated manner through a key
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Table 1: Security analysis.
Adversary behaviour Adversary behaviour description Max hops
Data pollution
Message
MACs
D‐MACs
t1 tL t
󳰀
1
u1 um+n· · · · · · · · · t󳰀L󳰀 𝑐 − 1
Tag pollution (MAC)
Message
MACs
D‐MACs
t1 tL t
󳰀
1
u1 um+n· · · · · · · · · t󳰀L󳰀 𝑐 − 1
Dual-tag pollution
(D-MAC)
Message
MACs
D‐MACs
t1 tL t
󳰀
1
u1 um+n· · · · · · · · · t󳰀L󳰀 𝑁 − 𝑖
A representation of adversary behavior. Max hops shows the maximum hops which the polluted packet can travel through the network. We consider the worst
case when the adversary node can have access to all the next 𝑐−1 nodes keys (say, a chain of 𝑐 compromised nodes; moreover, (𝑁− 𝑖) is the maximum number
of hops between the adversary and the sink node).
distribution scheme. In this section, we provide the model of
the key distribution scheme that we have adopted.
A set system is a pair (𝑋, 𝐹), where 𝑋 is a finite set of
elements and 𝐹 is an ordered set of subsets of𝑋.
Definition A. A set system (𝑋, 𝐹) is called a 𝑐 cover-free
family (c-CFF) if, for any 𝑐 sets 𝐴
1
, 𝐴
2
, . . . , 𝐴
𝑐
∈ 𝐹 and any
other set 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹, one has
𝐵 ̸⊂
𝑐
⋃
𝐽=1
𝐴
𝑖
. (8)
Definition B. A set system (𝑋, 𝐹) is called a (𝑐, 𝑑) cover-free
family ((c, d)-CFF) if, for any 𝑐 sets 𝐴
1
, 𝐴
2
, . . . , 𝐴
𝑐
∈ 𝐹 and
any other set 𝐵 ∈ 𝐹, one has
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
𝐵 \
𝑐
⋃
𝐽=1
𝐴
𝑗
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
> 𝑑. (9)
We believe that if key assignment is done properly, no
coalition of 𝑐 nodes can fool another node. Our key predis-
tribution scheme considers two key pools which are available
at the source node. We use all these two sets for checking the
message’s integrity. It is shown in [25] that, in order to resist
against less than 𝑐 compromised nodes, the cardinality of the
key size at the source must be (𝑐 + 1) times larger than those
key sizes at the relay/sink nodes, which could be expressed as
𝐿 ≥ (𝑐 + 1)𝑅, and 𝐿󸀠 ≥ (𝑐 + 1)𝑅󸀠. More specifically, we claim
that, by this model, we can be sure each verifier has some
shared keys which can verify the integrity of messages. Our
scheme assigns two sets K
𝑆
= {k
1
, k
2
, . . . , k
𝐿
}, k
𝑙
∈ F𝑚+𝑛+1
𝑝
,
K󸀠
𝑆
= {k󸀠
1
, k󸀠
2
, . . . , k󸀠
𝐿
󸀠}, k󸀠
𝑙
󸀠 ∈ F
𝐿+1
𝑝
to a source node where each
has 𝐿 = 𝐿󸀠 = |K
𝑆
| = |K󸀠
𝑆
| = 𝑒(𝑐 + 1) ln(1/𝑞) keys. Moreover,
we distribute two sets K
𝑛
𝑖
= {k
1
, . . . , k
𝑅
}, k
𝑟
∈ F𝑚+𝑛+1
𝑝
, and
K󸀠
𝑛
𝑖
= {k󸀠
1
, . . . , k󸀠
𝑅
󸀠}, k󸀠
𝑟
󸀠 ∈ F
𝐿+1
𝑝
to each node where each
of these sets has 𝑅 = 𝑅󸀠 = |K
𝑛
𝑖
| = |K󸀠
𝑛
𝑖
| = 𝑒 ln(1/√𝑞)
keys. In addition, 𝑞 is the security parameter and it stands as
𝑞 = (N ⋅ (𝑁
𝑐
))
−1, where 𝑁 is the total number of recipients
(usually 𝑞 = 10−3 would be sufficient) and 𝑐 is a fixed number
of corrupted users. Every key k
𝑟
or k󸀠
𝑟
󸀠 is included in a set of
each verifier with probability of 1/2(𝑐 + 1) (for simplicity, we
consider the same length for both poll keys).
5. Security Analysis
In this section, we analyse the possibilities of an adversary
launching pollution attack successfully. Hence, three possible
pollution attack behaviours are analysed, and their security
levels are quantified, respectively.We summarize our analysis
in Table 1. Finally, the possible knowledge that an adversary
can access is analysed.
5.1. The Resistance against Pollution Attack. We consider the
following three possible pollution attack scenarios.
5.1.1. 1st Pollution Behaviour: Data Pollution Attack. An
adversary node intends to make changes in a message. This
polluted message can be detected immediately by the next
hop, or in a few hops later (maximum 𝑐 − 1 hops later). It
means the polluted message should travel some hops to be
detected. The worst case happens whenever an adversary can
do coalition with the other 𝑐 − 1 compromised nodes.
5.1.2. 2nd Pollution Behaviour: Tag (i.e., MAC) Pollution
Attack. An adversary node intends to make changes in the
MACs. This attack can be detected immediately by the next
hop if he cannot compromise the next hop and get the next
hop keys, or in a few hops later (maximum 𝑐 − 1 hops later).
It is similar to the 1st pollution behaviour.
5.1.3. 3rd Pollution Behaviour: Dual-Tag (i.e., D-MAC) Pollu-
tion Attack. An adversary 𝑖 which is one of the𝑁 legitimate
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Table 2: Communication and computation overhead of Dual-HMAC and the two related works in [14] and [9].
[14] MacSig [9] Dual-HMAC
Type of key Symmetric Hybrid Symmetric
Data pollution Yes Yes Yes
Tag pollution No Yes Yes
Communication overhead 𝑙 𝑙 + 1 + (𝑙 key indexes) 𝑙
Computation overhead 𝑙 (𝑚 + 𝑛) 3
2
|𝑝|(𝑚 + 𝑙 + 1) + (𝑚 + 𝑛 + 1)𝑙
𝑙
2
(𝑚 + 𝑛 +
𝑙
2
+ 2)
nodes ((𝑁 − 𝑖) is the maximum number of hops between
the adversary and the sink node) intends to make changes
in D-MACs. This attack can be detected by the next hop
by the probability of 1/2(𝑐 + 1). The polluted D-MAC can
travel some hops, before it is detected, by the probability of
[1 − 1/2(𝑐 + 1)]
𝑁−𝑖 (see Theorem 3).
Theorem 3. The probability that a downstream user receives
the same key as 𝑘𝑒𝑦
𝑥
of user𝑥 is not less than [1−1/2(𝑐+1)]𝑁−𝑖.
Proof. The probability of recovering the same shared key
between two nodes is 1/2(𝑐+1), so the probability of the key
𝑥
from a user 𝑥 located in next hop 𝑥 + 1 is 1/2(𝑐 + 1), and this
probability would be (1/2(𝑐 + 1))2 if this key is found in two
hops later. In otherwords, if the total number of hops between
an intermediate node and a sink node, named as downstream
node, is (𝑁 − 𝑖), then the probability that a downstream
user receives the same key as key
𝑥
of user 𝑥 is not less than
[1 − 1/2(𝑐 + 1)]
𝑁−𝑖.
5.2. The Possible Knowledge of an Adversary. As outlined
in Section 3.2, we assume the source node is trustworthy
and the process of key predistribution is secure. Hence, the
secret key sets, K
𝑆
and K󸀠
𝑆
, assigned to the source node
are considered secure. However, an adversary can wiretap all
the data communication in a network and may compromise
several relay or sink nodes. Hence, the adversary can get
access to the received packets from the previous hops, the
key information distributed to him by the KDC, and the key
information stored at the compromised nodes.
6. Performance Evaluation
In this section, communication and computation overhead of
the proposed Dual-HMAC scheme are presented.
6.1. Communication Overhead. In our scheme, each source
message has 𝑚 + 𝑛 codewords and each codeword has log
2
𝑝
bits. So, the bit-length of a source message is (𝑚 + 𝑛)log
2
𝑝.
The 𝐿MACs and the 𝐿󸀠 D-MACs are appended to the source
message. We consider log
2
𝑝 symbols for each MAC and D-
MAC. By fixing 𝐿 + 𝐿󸀠 = 𝑙, our scheme has the following
communication overhead:
(𝐿 + 𝐿
󸀠
) log
2
𝑝
(𝑚 + 𝑛) log
2
𝑝
=
𝐿 + 𝐿
󸀠
𝑚 + 𝑛
=
𝑙
𝑚 + 𝑛
. (10)
Hence, the Dual-HMAC scheme’s overhead is equal to
the scheme presented in [14]. However this scheme is vulner-
able to tag pollution. Additionally, the bandwidth overhead
between our scheme and the scheme proposed in [9] is given
by the following equation:
𝑂
𝑏Dual-HMAC
𝑂
𝑏MacSig
=
𝑙/ (𝑚 + 𝑛)
(𝑙 + 1) / (𝑚 + 𝑛) + 32𝑙/128 (𝑚 + 𝑛)
=
1
1.25 + 1/𝑙
.
(11)
Base on (11), the bandwidth overhead comparison
between our scheme and the scheme described in [9], for
different values of 𝑐, is depicted in the graphs included in
Figure 4.
6.2. Computation Overhead. Recall that, to append 𝐿MACs
and 𝐿󸀠 D-MACs, 𝐿(𝑚 + 𝑛 + 1) and 𝐿󸀠(𝐿 + 1) multiplication
operations for MACs and D-MACs are needed, respectively.
In addition, for verification, we consider that all the relay
nodes have shared keys and each node needs to verify the
message. So, as shown in (6) and (7), our scheme needs 𝐿(𝑚+
𝑛+1)multiplications for MACs and 𝐿󸀠(𝐿+1)multiplications
for D-MACs.
7. Discussion
The number of appended tags which is needed in [14] is 𝑙.
However, the total number of tags (homomorphicMACs and
a signature) which is used in [9] is 𝑙 + 1 + (𝑙 key indexes).
Moreover, the works in [9, 14] need to use 𝑙(𝑚 +
𝑛) and (3/2)|𝑝|(𝑚 + 𝑙 + 1) + (𝑚 + 𝑛 + 1)𝑙 multiplica-
tions for the verification phase, respectively. Table 2 sum-
marizes the communication and computation overhead of
our work (i.e., Dual-HMAC) and the two related works in
[9, 14].
To conclude this section, consider the following.
(i) Dual-HMAC incurs a relatively low communication
overhead which is almost equal to [14]; however,
our scheme’s overhead, according to (11), saves up to
(1.25 + 1/𝑙) in comparing to MacSig approach [9].
This means that our scheme provides at least 25%
bandwidth saving.
(ii) Dual-HMAC not only slightly increases the tag pol-
lution resistance, but also decreases the computation
overhead compared to the schemes in [9, 14].
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Figure 4: The bandwidth overhead comparison. By fixing 𝛿 = 0.1, 𝑛 = 20m, 𝜀 = 0.01 [9], we depict three scenarios (1), (2), and (3) and we
use 𝑐 = 1, 2, 3 for each of them, respectively.
(iii) Dual-HMAC provides resistance for half of the tags
against tag pollution attack. This results in reducing
the possibility of tag pollution around 50% compared
to the work presented in [14].
(iv) Dual-HMAC uses symmetric keys, in contrast to
MacSig scheme using symmetric and public keys.
8. Conclusion
Network coding-enabled WSNs are susceptible to pollution
attack where a small number of polluted messages can cor-
rupt bunches of legitimatemessages.This paper has presented
a homomorphic MAC-based scheme, called Dual-HMAC,
for network coding-enabled WSNs. The proposed scheme
makes use of two types of tags to provide resistance against
data pollution attacks and partially tag pollution attacks. The
partial protection against tag pollution is related to the key
predistribution model. Furthermore, our proposed scheme
presents low communication overhead and low computa-
tional overhead compared to other existing schemes. Finally,
as future work, we plan to propose a scheme that will mitigate
not only partially tag pollution attacks but also tag pollution
attacks.
Notations
𝑚: The number of packets per generation
u
𝑖
: The 𝑖th source message
𝑛: The number of symbols of each packet
𝑝: A finite field size (say, 28)
𝑞: A security parameter (say, 10−3)
𝐿: The number of MACs
𝐿
󸀠: The number of D-MACs
𝑙: The number of source keys (𝑙 = 𝑙
1
+ 𝑙
2
)
𝑡
𝑖
: The 𝑖th MAC
𝑡
󸀠
𝑖
: The 𝑖th D-MAC
𝑁: The number of verifiers
𝑐: The number of compromised nodes
K
𝑆
,K󸀠
𝑆
: The two polls of keys of source
K
𝑛
𝑖
,K󸀠
𝑛
𝑖
: The two polls of keys of 𝑖th node.
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